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This Essay explores the issue of when multiple clients may consent to
concurrent representation by a single lawyer.' Most American jurisdictions
evaluate client consent according to rules formulated by the American Bar
Association.2 The rules allow clients to waive their lawyers' conflicts of
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1. Numerous commentators have addressed general issues relating to conflict-of-interest rules,
including what constitutes a conflict, what standards of regulation should apply, and whether regulation
should focus on particular areas of practice. See, e.g., Robert H. Aronson, Conflict ofInterest, 52 WASH.
L. REV. 807 (1977) (identifying a range of situations involving conflicts of interests); Kevin McMunigal,
Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823 (1992) (raising questions
about conflict-of-interest regulation and, particularly, about how conflicts should be defined); Marc I.
Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interests: The Need for a Coherent Framework,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1990) (arguing for more context-specific regulation of conflicts of interest).
Most of the commentators who have considered when consent to conflicts of interests should be honored
have discussed the issue only in passing. See, e.g., McMunigal, supra, at 875-76 (noting unresolved
issues under the professional rules regarding who should decide whether the risk of impaired lawyer
performance justifies prohibiting concurrent representation); Fred C. Zacharias, Foreword: The Quest
for the Perfect Code, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 6-8, on file with The
Yale Law Journal) (mentioning weaknesses in California's regulation of consent in conflict-of-interest
cases); cf Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, When Waiver Should Not Be Good Enough: An Analysis
of Current Client Conflicts Law, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 145 (1997) (analyzing which conflicts should
be waivable but focusing primarily on the difficulty of crafting a manageable bright-line rule); Nancy L.
Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed
Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REv. 211 (1982) (providing a useful pre-
Model Rules analysis of concurrent client regulation).
2. Virtually all states except California follow one of the two model ethics codes developed by
the American Bar Association (ABA): the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995)
[hereinafter MODEL RULES] (adopted in 1983), and the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1979) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND ETHICS 5 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing state adoptions of the ABA model codes). Observers agree
that the Model Rules' formulation of conflict-of-interest regulation is an advance over the less
sophisticated Model Code provisions. See, e.g., CHARLES NV. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
§ 7.1.1, at 314 (1986) (noting that the Model Rules "substantially improve on" the Model Code); cf
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 624 (2d ed. 1994) ("Case law
on conflicts issues filled the gaps left by the Canons and the Model Code"); Moore, supra note 1, at 220-
29 (illustrating the inadequacies of the Model Code's approach). Accordingly, most American
jurisdictions have adopted some form of Model Rule 1.7. See infra notes 3, 17, 18 and sources cited
therein.
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interest but impose significant limitations on that right This Essay concludes
that the prevailing consent model is fundamentally flawed.
In order to highlight problems with the ABA approach, this Essay
focuses on the primary alternative: California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-
310.5 Like other American jurisdictions, California forbids lawyers to
represent clients whose interests conflict, or potentially conflict, with the
interests of another current client, a former client, or the lawyer6 herself.7 But
unlike the other states, California's conflicts provision gives potentially
prejudiced clients an absolute right to waive a conflict.' The viability of this
provision has been questioned even in California. At least one appellate court
3. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(a), (b). The Model Code, in a similar but more
opaque fashion, recognizes the right of clients to consent to conflicted representation, but only when "it
is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent the interests of each .... MODEL CODE, supra note
2, DR 5-105(C). Only four jurisdictions currently follow DR 5-105. See COLO. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1996); NEB. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1996);
TENN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1997); VT. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1992). Several others adopted provisions based on DR 5-105 but amended
them (sometimes to bring them more in line with the Model Rules). See, e.g., GA. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1996) (eliminating small portions of the rule); IOWA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR 5-105 (1994) (eliminating a small portion of the
rule and adding a special provision for matrimonial cases); MASS. CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY
RULES DR 5-105 (1996) (adding a provision for "public counsel"); N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1994) (adding an imputed disqualification provision); OHIO CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1995) (eliminating portions of the rule); VA. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1994) (adding a successive representation provision).
4. This Essay does not focus on the broader question of what level of information clients must
receive to be capable of giving informed consent. A few commentators have analyzed this issue in the
conflicts realm and elsewhere. See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 307 (1980) (discussing the level of information clients should be required to have
before being allowed to authorize acts by lawyers); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) (arguing for
an approach to legal "informed" client consent similar to that prevailing in the medical profession);
Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model ofAttorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy,
65 N.C. L. REv. 315 (1987) (same).
5. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310(C) (1992) [hereinafter CAL. RULES].
6. Compare id Rule 3-310, with MODEL CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-1 to 5-3, DR 5-105, and
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rules 1.7 to 1.9. To avoid repetition, this Essay will refer primarily to the
Model Rules conflict provisions.
7. This Essay treats the lawyer with a potential conflict as female. For balance, I treat the other
actors in the process (e.g., clients and opposing counsel) as male.
8. Compare CAL. RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3-310, with MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule
1.7(a)(2) (authorizing lawyers to accept client consent only when the lawyers reasonably believe that the
representation will not be adversely affected). California's general approach to legal ethics has long been
considered idiosyncratic. Most states' rules of professional conduct mirror or adapt the ABA's two
model ethics codes. See GILLERS, supra note 2, at 5. California has gone its own way in many important
areas of professional regulation other than conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d
150 (Cal. 1993) (approving, for the first time, noncomp-tition covenants in law firm partnership
agreements); STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS at xiii (1996 ed.) (noting that California was the last jurisdiction to adopt a rule governing
lawyers' statements to the press); Roderick W. Leonard, The New California Rules of Professional
Conduct: What They Mean, 11 GLENDALE L. REV. I (1992) (analyzing California's 1989 reformulation
of its professional rules provision by provision); Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in
California, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 367 (1994) (discussing California's unique approach to attorney-
client confidentiality).
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has suggested that, despite the Code's absolute language, some conflicts of
interests are nonwaivable.9
California's rule and the judicial response raise important questions about
the proper role of consent in conflict-of-interest situations. Consider this
example:
Two criminal codefendants, one an alleged drug kingpin and the
other a lieutenant in his organization, retain the organization's
regular lawyer to represent them. They consent to joint
representation after being informed of the potential for conflicting
interests.'
Or, consider this common illustration from a transactional setting:
A commercial real estate developer agrees to buy a parcel of land.
The developer retains an attorney to represent it and the seller of
the property. Both clients are informed of the potential conflict of
interest. The seller agrees to the multiple representation because
the transaction seems straightforward and the developer has
agreed to pay the cost of the representation."
Should such clients be able to waive lawyer conflicts? When, if ever,
should the clients' waivers be overridden? Why, for example, do the
California courts foresee a need to find exceptions to California's
unambiguous waiver rule?
The following pages analyze these issues. Part I contrasts the conflicts
provisions in the California Code with those in the ABA Model Rules. Part II
considers the reasons why regulators sometimes allow clients to waive the
regulatory protections. Part III identifies the reasons why courts typically
reserve the power to void client consent if the regulators have not done so.
The Essay then attempts to draw from California's experience. Part IV
describes and evaluates the judicial effort to modify California's absolute
waiver provision. Part V concludes that California's conflict-of-interest rule
9. See Klemm v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (Ct. App. 1977) (stating in dicta that
actual conflicts at trial or hearing are nonwaivable); see also Tsakos Shipping & Trading v. Juniper
Garden Town Homes, Ltd., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585, 598 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Klemm's dicta with
approval); People v. Sanford, 219 Cal. Rptr. 726, 729-30 (Ct. App. 1985) (applying Klemm but holding
the conflict in question to be waivable); Sklar v. Review Dep't, 2 Cal. St. B. Ct. Rptr. 602, 615 (1993)
(approving Klemm's dicta); cf Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 955 (Cal. 1995) (supporting the
view that disqualification in actual concurrent conflict cases is usually "automatic"); L.A. County Bar
Ass'n, Formal Op. 471 (1994) (suggesting that a client may not agree to representation in which it is
unlikely that the lawyer can represent the client competently).
10. This scenario was addressed in a series of cases culminating in Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153 (1988). In these cases, the government typically challenged the joint representation on the
alternative grounds that it was unfair to one of the defendants, that it was prejudicial to the ability of the
government to obtain convictions through pleas or grand jury testimony, and that it was prejudicial to
the fair administration ofjustice. See sources cited infra note 69.
11. See, e.g., In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1076, 1078 (N.J. 1978).
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focuses insufficiently on the contradictory purposes that conflict regulation
serves. The analysis, however, suggests that the ABA alternatives are equally
flawed. Part VI therefore offers a new codification of principles regarding
waiver of conflicts among concurrent clients that would accomplish the goals
of conflicts-of-interest regulation more effectively.
I. THE CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST RULES
The Model Rules contain two rules governing conflicts of interest among
current clients. Model Rule 1.7(a) provides in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to another client. ..
Model Rule 1.7(b) provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client .... 13
The California Rules of Professional Conduct, though worded differently,
contain similar proscriptions against conflicted representation:
A member shall not...
(1) Accept representation of more than one client in a matter in
which the interests of the clients potentially conflict; or
(2) Accept or continue representation of more than one client in a
matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; or
(3) Represent a client in a matter and at the same time in a separate
matter accept as a client a person or entity whose interest in the
first matter is adverse to the client in the first matter. 4
Both the Model Rules and the California conflict-of-interest rules allow
current clients to waive their objections to the conflicting representation. The
ABA formulation is, however, more guarded in its attitude toward consent.
5
The two ABA provisions limit the client's ability to authorize the
representation when the lawyer concludes that the consent is tactically unwise.
12. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(a).
13. Id. Rule 1.7(b).
14. CAL. RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3-310(C).
15. The ABA attitude toward representation of successive clients defers more to client
decisionmaking and thus merges with California's approach. The Model Rules assume that former
clients have a lesser right to demand the loyalty of a former attorney. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2,
Rule 1.9 cmt. Although there are situations in which a lawyer may not act adversely to the interests of a
former client, the former client's right to consent to such representation is absolute. See id. Rule 1.9(a),
(b). This rule parallels the California Code's comprehensive conclusion that any conflict of interest can
be approved through "the informed written consent of the client or former client." CAL. RULES, supra
note 5, Rule 3-310(E).
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Under Model Rule 1.7(a), the lawyer may not accept a client's consent if she
believes, or should believe, that the representation will "adversely affect [her]
relationship with the other client.' 16 Similarly, under Model Rule 1.7(b), the
lawyer may not accept a client's waiver if she believes that the representation
will be "adversely affected."'
17
In contrast, the California code exhibits no hesitation about allowing
concurrent clients to waive conflicts. The prohibition against the
representation itself contains the caveat that the prohibition applies only when
the lawyer acts "without the informed written consent of each client."'"
At least one jurisdiction, Oregon, takes a third, slightly different,
approach to the issue of consent. 19 The Oregon Code of Professional
16. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(a)(1).
17. Id. Rule 1.7(b)(1). The following jurisdictions have adopted provisions identical to Model
Rule 1.7: ALA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997); ARIZ. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1995); ARK. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997); CONN. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1995); DEL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997);
HAW. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1994); IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.7 (1996); IND. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1996); KAN. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1994); Ky. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1996);
MIcH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1993); MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.7 (1997); Mo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997); MONT. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1994); OKLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1994);
PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1993); R.I. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.7 (1996); S.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997); S.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1994); and W. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1994).
Several others have adopted the essence of Rule 1.7 but have made minor modifications. See, e.g.,
RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR Rule 4-1.7 (1994) (amending Rule 1.7(a)(1) slightly and adding a
provision relating to familial representation); ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1995)
(requiring "disclosure" instead of "consultation"); LA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7
(1995) (adding a "loyalty" provision); MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7
(1994) (expanding the disclosure requirement); MISS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7
(1995) (expanding the consent requirement); NEv. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 157 (1993)
(adding a suggestion of written disclosure); N.H. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1995)
(expanding the consent requirement); N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997) (adding a
disclosure requirement and forbidding consent by a public entity); N.M. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 16-107 (1997) (expanding the consultation requirement); N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (1997) (expanding the disclosure requirement and adding provisions regarding
continuing obligation to evaluate conflicts and subsequent representation); N.D. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997) (rewording Rule 1.7 and adding a confidentiality provision);
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1993) (adding a provision forbidding the
representation of adverse parties in separate matters); WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.7 (1996) (expanding the consultation and disclosure requirements and adding a provision for
representatives of governmental entities); WIs. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT SCR 20:1.7 (1993)
(adding a written-consent requirement).
18. CAL. RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3-310(C). The Califomia rule mirrors a proposal made by
the American Trial Lawyers' Association (ATLA) as an alternative to the Model Rules. The ATLA
provision stated: "A lawyer may serve one or more clients, despite a divided loyalty, if each client who
is or may be adversely affected by the divided loyalty is fully informed of the actual or potential adverse
effects, and voluntarily consents." Moore, supra note I, at 215 n.19 (quoting the ATLA proposal).
19. Oregon's approach is championed in Jarvis & Tellam, supra note 1. As discussed above,
Jarvis and Tellam argue that joint representation rarely can be justified, even in instances when the
clients conclude that they would benefit from the representation. See id. at 175. Jarvis and Tellam also
suggest that the District of Columbia's recent amendments to its conflict rule produce a provision
virtually identical to Oregon's. See id. at 172. The District's rule, however, may honor client consent in
some actual conflict-of-interest situations, in contrast to Oregon's absolute prohibition. See D.C. RULES
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Responsibility follows the Model Rules but amends them to distinguish
between waivable and nonwaivable conflicts." When an actual conflict
exists--"when the lawyer has a duty to contend for something on behalf of
one client that the lawyer has a duty to oppose on behalf of another client ' -
she may not accept a client's consent.22 In contrast, when a conflict of interest
is only potential, or "likely,"23 consent is permissible.24
II. REASONS FOR ALLOWING CLIENT WAIVER OF CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST
PROTECTIONS
Most justifications for client consent provisions are premised on the view
that honoring consent exhibits concern for client autonomy.25 Identifying the
meaning of autonomy in this context is not simple.26 To the extent that
autonomy simply refers to a client's right to make choices, it is tautological to
say that honoring consent enhances autonomy. Yet clearly autonomy does not
mean that a client can or should be able to do whatever he wishes. A client
may not bribe a juror, choose to commit perjury, or insist that his lawyer
commit malpractice. The conceptualization of autonomy as client freedom
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)(1) (1996) [hereinafter D.C. RULES] (referring to the consent
provisions of Rule 1.7).
For other jurisdictions that have adopted provisions diverging substantially from both the Model
Rules and Model Code, see ME. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.4 (1992), which
combines Model Rule 1.7 and Model Code DR 5-105, and TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rules 1.06 to 1.07 (1997), which abbreviates Model Rule 1.7 and adds a caveat that cases
involving adversaries are nonwaivable. Cf. P.R. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 21 (1994)
(adopting a general anticonflict rule emphasizing loyalty and forbidding a lawyer from representing
conflicting interests when "it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose").
20. OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1992) [hereinafter OR. CODE];
accord D.C. RULES, supra note 19, Rule 1.7 (b)(1).
21. OR. CODE, supra note 20, DR 5-105(A)(1).
22. The Oregon Code provides, in pertinent part: "Except as provided in DR 5-105(F), a lawyer
shall not represent multiple current clients in any matters when such representation would result in an
actual or likely conflict." Id DR 5-105(E). The Oregon rule is absolute in this regard. The District of
Columbia rule seems to allow some wiggle room for consent in certain actual conflict cases. See D.C.
RULES, supra note 19, Rule 1.7(c).
23. OR. CODE, supra note 20, DR 5-105(E).
24. The Oregon Code states that "[a] lawyer may represent multiple current clients in instances
otherwise prohibited by DR 5-105(E) when such representation would not result in an actual conflict and
when each client consents to the multiple representation after full disclosure." Id DR 5-105(F).
25. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1350 (9th Cir. 1981)
(citing the client's right to make risky choices); Zador Corp. v. Kwan, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754, 759 (Ct.
App. 1995) (relying on an autonomy rationale); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 202 cmt. g(iv), reporter's note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] ("The preferred position, taken in the Comment, is that in most circumstances concern
for client autonomy warrants respecting a client's informed consent."); WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 7.2.2
("Giving effect to a client's consent to a conflicting representation must rest either on the ground of
contract freedom or on the related ground of personal autonomy .. "); Strauss, supra note 4, at 336-39
(arguing for an informed consent model that heightens the emphasis on client autonomy in the lawyer-
client relationship).
26. Similar issues hound the notion of autonomy in the medical context. See, e.g., CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (forthcoming
1998) (manuscript at 39-52, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (describing various possible "models of
autonomy" in the context of medical practice).
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therefore does little to advance the determination of which client choices
should be honored.
Confusion over the meaning of autonomy appears most starkly in the
comments to Section 202 of the recently adopted Restatement (Third) of the
Lav Governing Lawyers:27
Concern for client autonomy generally warrants respecting a
client's informed consent. In some situations, however, joint
representation would be objectively inadequate despite a client's
voluntary and informed consent.28
The relationship between the objective adequacy of the representation and the
client's autonomy is not obvious. The freedom to choose presumably
encompasses the right to choose unwisely.29 If the adequacy of the
representation is to be considered in deciding whether honoring client choice
enhances autonomy, then the Restatement drafters must be saying that the
autonomy in question is a "good thing" only if it benefits, or might benefit, the
client.3" This version (or vision) of autonomy justifies consent only when the
client has a valid instrumental reason for exercising a questionable choice.
The California conflict rules seem to express a preference for the
tautological view of autonomy. The exercise of choice itself is a benefit that
justifies honoring consent.3 California's professional regulators have acted on
27. The Restatement was formally approved in May, 1998, subject to the Reporter's final editing
and revision. The most recent published draft addressing conflicts of interest was circulated in March,
1996. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25. Except where otherwise specified, this Essay will therefore
cite to the 1996 version, with apologies to the drafters if the final version should include changes of
which the author is presently unaware.
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 202 cmt. g(iv).
29. See David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 467, 472
(analyzing the argument that lawyers sometimes have better senses than the clients themselves of what is
good for the clients and noting that "what is good according to a person's own values" may not be the
same thing as "what is in the person's best interest"); Moore, supra note 1, at 236-37, 237 n.128
(relating theories of paternalism to conflicts-of-interest regulation); Strauss, supra note 4, at 321-22
(discussing the justifications for paternalistic behavior by lawyers).
30. Contrast this with the way professional code drafters traditionally have treated autonomy in
the context of attorney-client confidentiality. Here, the drafters refer to autonomy in its starkest sense, as
a right that has value independent of the results to which it leads. Proponents of strict confidentiality
rules argue that there is a societal benefit simply in letting clients make choices and decisions within the
legal system. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Laivyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 ("[]ncreasing individual autonomy is
morally good."). Attorney-client confidentiality arguably is necessary to enable clients to obtain the
information that enables them to exercise their ability to choose. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4, 27-41 (1975) (discussing the importance of
confidentiality in enabling a client to give his lawyer information so that the client can present an
effective case with his lawyer's assistance); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETHICS 6-10, 14-17, 43-64 (1990) (discussing the importance of client autonomy in defining the
lawyer's role). The existence of confidentiality does not turn on whether the decisions it allows clients to
make are wise.
31. See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 26, at 40-52 (discussing the mandatory autonomy model
and citing authorities); Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27
CAT-. U. L. REv. 191, 204 (1978) (arguing for the inherent importance of client autonomy); Pepper,
supra note 30, at 616-18 (discussing the inherent value of autonomy); Strauss, supra note 4, at 336
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a similar preference in adopting an absolute attorney-client confidentiality
provision: Lawyers may not use confidential information to frustrate a client's
exercise of autonomy, even if withholding such information may jeopardize
the life of a third party.32 Thus, it is easy to imagine that the California Code's
drafters have relied upon pure autonomy notions in giving clients an absolute
right to waive conflicts of interest, regardless of the consequences to
themselves.
Alternatively, the California consent provisions may simply mask
confusion over how far the right to autonomy should extend. The ABA codes
and the Restatement certainly suggest that, in order to be honored, the exercise
of the consent power must be reasonable. Yet, on the surface, it seems
inherently unreasonable for a client to accept a lawyer who may exercise less
than independent judgment on the client's behalf.33 To proffer qualifying acts
of autonomy, one must be able to identify situations in which rational clients
are justified in choosing imperfect representati9n.34
The most obvious justification is cost.3" Using a single lawyer jointly can
save clients the expense of duplicative representation.36 Even when clients are
antagonists, the potential benefits that an aggressive, unconflicted lawyer
might achieve on behalf of a client may be less than the expense of the
("[C]lient decisionmaking is an inherent good because it recognizes individual dignity and personhood,
and the right of self-determination."); cf DAN W. BROCK, LIFE AND DEATH: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 34 (1993) (arguing that deferring decisionmaking power to doctors can conflict
impermissibly with patient self-determination).
32. California's confidentiality rule is found in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (\Vest 1990
& Supp. 1998). The Code provides, in pertinent part, that "it is the duty of an attorney... [t]o maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her
client." Id. Although there is some argument that this absolute provision is subject to common-sense
exceptions, at least one local bar association has issued an opinion holding that the risk of death to a
third party does not justify breaching confidentiality. See San Diego County Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics &
Unlawful Pracs. Comm., Op. 1990-1, at 3 (1990); see also Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation
Concerning a Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1467, 1468 (1995) (noting that some
California decisions have recognized the existence of implied confidentiality exceptions); Zacharias,
supra note 8, at 369 n.3, 371 n.14 (citing authorities supporting and questioning the absoluteness of
California's confidentiality rule).
33. It is in part for this reason that Peter Jarvis and Bradley Tellam support the Oregon
approach, which forbids consent to any representation involving an actual conflict of interest. See Jarvis
& Tellam, supra note 1.
34. Of course, to some degree virtually every representation is burdened by personal interests on
the part of the lawyer, including the desire to collect fees, to impress clients and onlookers, and to enjoy
the job.
35. See, e.g., Kaiser v. Stewart, No. CIV.A.96-6643, 1997 WL 186329, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10,
1997) (holding that, in a complicated multidefendant lawsuit, "[it is not for the court to second guess
decisions of the various defendants... [or] to compel a party to engage separate counsel [they] may not
be able to afford"); Teresa Stanton Collett, The Promise and Peril of Multiple Representation, 16 REv.
LITIG. 567, 574-78 (1997) (cataloguing some benefits of multiple representation); Richard A. Epstein,
The Legal Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 592 (1992)
(describing some of the savings that may be inherent in concurrent representation).
36. See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 1, at 822-33 (cataloguing instances in which multiple clients
with potentially or actually conflicting interests might prefer joint representation in order to save on
costs, including insurers-insureds, buyer-sellers, borrowers-lenders, husbands-wives, and joint plaintiffs
or defendants); see also Conrad Chevrolet v. Rood, 862 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Ky. 1993) (Spain, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a waiver of a conflict in reducing the parties' negotiations to writing should be
permissible).
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additional representation. Thus, for example, both parties to a divorce
proceeding may prefer to divide their community resources using the advice
of a single lawyer even though the advice may serve one client better than the
other.37
A client might also wish to retain a lawyer who has conflicting
responsibilities because that lawyer has the best qualifications for the job.3
Suppose, for example, that a criminal defendant's alibi witness has personal
reasons for not wanting to appear at the defendant's trial. The witness's
lawyer is known to be the best defense lawyer in town. That lawyer is willing
to represent the defendant, but only on the condition that the defendant waive
the conflict of interest and agree that the lawyer need not use the alibi defense
if it would entail calling the witness-client to the stand. The defendant may
reasonably conclude that he is better off with this lawyer arguing insanity or
reasonable doubt than he would be if a different, but lesser, lawyer who has no
conflict argues the alibi defense.39
Likewise, clients may wish to retain a conflicted lawyer because they
know and trust her.4" They may be unsure of their ability to relate as well to a
new lawyer. Although this rationale often has been overemphasized, it
sometimes has been recognized in cases in which a client has sought to keep
counsel who may be called as a witness at trial.4
37. See Halvorsen v. Halvorsen, 479 P.2d 161 (wash. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that concurrent
representation of husband and wife is proper as long as no actual conflict of interest exists); see also
Moore, supra note 1, at 245-58 (discussing the history and wisdom of permitting joint representation of
spouses seeking a divorce); cf Or. St. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 86 (1991) (holding that joint
representation of divorcing spouses is usually improper).
38. See, e.g., Fisons Corp. v. Atochem N. Am., Inc., No. 90 Civ. 1080, 1990 WL 180551, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1990) (approving a client's consent to representation by a lawyer with a conflict
because, in the client's judgment, "it was far more important that it obtain the benefit of [the law firm's]
familiarity with the ongoing trademark dispute than it was to avoid facing any adverse consequences due
to its attorney's conflict of interest").
39. In some situations, multiple representation may afford the client actual tactical advantages,
including the ability to present joint claims or to stonewall an attack. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("A common defense often gives strength against a
common attack."); see also sources cited infra note 69 (discussing several examples of ways in which a
lawyer can orchestrate stonewalling by common clients).
40. See, e.g., Karen A. Covy, Note, The Right to Counsel of One's Choice: Joint Representation
of Criminal Defendants, 58 NOTRE DAME L. RV. 793, 801-02 (1983) (discussing a criminal client's
limited right to counsel of his choice and the importance of trust in choosing an attorney).
41. See, e.g., State v. Vanover, 559 N.W.2d 618, 634 (Iowa 1997) (noting that, for purposes of
disqualification, "a long-standing professional relationship could conceivably create a situation where an
attorney has an extraordinary and irreplaceable familiarity with the affairs of his client" (citing
MacArthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1981))); Note, The Advocate-
Witness Rule: If Z, then X But Why?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1365, 1398 (1977) (noting that a "client's
confidence and trust in his chosen counsel is an interest worthy of protection," discussing the case law,
and arguing for a more relaxed professional rule that would give more weight to the client's desires); cf
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 168 cmt. h, reporter's note (Tentative Draft
No. 8, 1997) ("Courts normally are reluctant to accept the challenged lawyer's own assertion of a unique
psychological or other need on the part of the client for the lawyer's services."). In California, courts
currently do not need to resort to this rationale because the California professional rule governing
lawyers who may be witnesses gives clients an absolute right to consent to the continued representation.
See CAL. RULES, supra note 5, Rule 5-210 ("A member shall not act as an advocate before a jury which
will hear testimony from the member unless... [t]he member has the informed, written consent of the
client.").
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Finally, particularly within specialized practice areas or in small towns in
which few lawyers practice and in which most residents know each other,
using a conflicted lawyer may be the only feasible way to obtain
representation. Imagine a farmer who sues his neighbor for stealing his
chickens. His lawyer is in the process of accepting the representation of the
neighbor in an unrelated matter. The magnitude of the potential recoveries in
the chicken case and the neighbor's unrelated matter do not justify the
expense of hiring an out-of-town lawyer. Arguably, both clients would be
reasonable in taking the risk of hiring the lawyer with conflicting
responsibilities."
In each of these categories of cases, the clients could, in theory, retain
independent counsel. As a strategic matter, some of the clients probably would
be wise to do so. To the extent the professional codes allow the clients to
consent to the conflicted representation, the codes simply are saying that
either choice is sufficiently reasonable to fit within the scope of that autonomy
the codes are willing to recognize.43 Alternatively, the codes may be saying
that the disadvantages of the conflicted representation are sufficiently
speculative or limited that the spiritual benefits of honoring client autonomy
should trump.
Ill. REASONS FOR OVERRIDING CLIENT CONSENT
Under the tautological view of autonomy, there can only be one reason
for refusing to honor a client's waiver. A lawyer, disciplinary agency, or
court44 that believes the client is insufficiently informed to make an intelligent
42. Cf Jarvis & Tellam, supra note 1, at 175-76 (asserting that the costs of disallowing joint
representation in small cases involving a conflict are not significant).
As suggested in the text, the same considerations may apply even in larger jurisdictions, in
situations in which only a few good lawyers practice a particular speciality. A client may prefer to hire
one of those lawyers despite a conflict of interest rather than seek less qualified representation or
representation from a different jurisdiction. Cf. Note, Prospective Waiver of the Right to Disqualify
Counsel for Conflicts of Interest, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1074, 1075 & n.6 (1981) (recognizing that a
specialized firm might be unwilling to represent small or one-time clients if that representation would
foreclose the potential for representing clients in more lucrative matters down the road).
43. Richard Epstein explains this approach in a more sophisticated way. He suggests that
conflict-of-interest rules are designed to set a default position, or baseline, designed to limit agency costs
in bargaining between lawyers and clients. Whenever a client entrusts information to a lawyer, the client
risks the possibility that the lawyer will use the information to his disadvantage; for example, in
subsequent representation adverse to the client. Part of the fee clients pay includes protections against
such conduct, including confidentiality and conflict rules that help prevent the conduct. See Epstein,
supra note 35, at 580-83. In Epstein's view, these protections should be subject to bargaining. The right
to bargain is validated by the presence of consent and waiver provisions in the rules. See id at 590; see
also Bruce A. Green, Conflicts ofInterest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 71, 71-
72 (1996) (characterizing conflict rules as rules of "risk avoidance" that allocate the risk that a lawyer's
representation of one client will injure another).
44. Each of these actors may be a decisionmaker on the issue of waiver. The lawyer must make
a judgment in the first instance of whether to accept or continue with the representation. A disciplinary
agency may need to rule on the subject before the fact, in the context of an advisory opinion or, after the
fact, in response to a specific complaint of improper concurrent representation. A court may need to rule
on the waiver in assessing a motion to disqualify the conflicted lawyer, in making an independent
judgment on whether the representation- in a matter before the court is appropriate, or in deciding a
subsequent malpractice action or fee dispute.
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choice is justified in concluding that the client's choice does not represent a
fair exercise of the client's freedom.45 Even California recognizes this
justification for setting aside a client's consent.46
There is a related justification that straddles the line between the
competing visions of autonomy. On occasion, judges have postulated that a
particular conflict situation is so inherently complex that a lawyer cannot
explain the situation in sufficient detail to enable the client to make an
informed choice47 or cannot offer an explanation in an impartial manner.48
Here, a court purports to honor the client's right to autonomy; it simply
concludes that the client's waiver was not informed. In actuality, however,
the court is determining that autonomy can never be implemented properly in
such situations. In essence, the court rejects the autonomy principle for a
limited set of circumstances.
The Restatement's approach to autonomy suggests that conflict
regulation may protect clients more directly from their own poor choices.4 9
The ABA exceptions to the consent authority are examples of this attitude.5"
Lawyers may not accept conflicted representation when, despite the client's
consent, the representation is likely to be inadequate or "adversely affected"
45. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 490-91 (Utah 1991) (holding that a criminal
defendant was inadequately informed and so could not have effectively consented to conflicted
representation); see also Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1060, 1065-66 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that a
client's consent was sufficiently informed), aff'd sub nom. Fraboni v. Pullman, 547 F.2d 1160 (3d Cir.
1976); Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 844-46 (D.C. 1994) (holding that an individual partner of a
client company was inadequately informed with respect to joint representation by a law firm of the
partnership and another partner).
46. See, e.g., Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak, 820 F. Supp. 1212, 1216-18 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (rejecting uninformed consent even though the client was a sophisticated corporate entity).
47. See, e.g., Kelly v. Greason, 244 N.E.2d 456, 462 (N.Y. 1968) ("[Tlhe unsophisticated client
... may not be... able to understand the ramifications of the conflict, however much explained to
him."); In re Boivin, 533 P.2d 171, 174-75 (Or. 1975) (noting that in some situations clients cannot
understand a lawyer's disclosure and therefore cannot consent); cf Strauss, supra note 4, at 344-46
(discussing a theory of paternalism that would allow lawyers to override client consent when clients are
incapable of understanding the complexities of the decision to be made).
Jarvis and Tellam discuss a fairly recent New Jersey opinion that seems to follow this approach.
See Jarvis & Tellam, supra note 1, at 157. In Baldasarre v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 467 (N.J. 1993), the
court held that in complex commercial real estate transactions the potential for conflict was too great to
allow even informed participants to consent to joint representation. Although the court did not explain
its decision, the emphasis on the complexity of such transactions is explicable only if the court viewed
these transactions as so complicated that clients could not understand the lawyer's explanation of
conflict issues.
48. Thus, for example, the incentives for the lawyer to encourage joint representation may be so
overpowering that a court could conclude that the lawyer cannot provide the requisite information. See
infra text accompanying notes 77-80 (discussing lawyers' personal incentives in obtaining client
consent).
49. This approach, in general, raises a host of issues associated with lawyer paternalism. See
generally Luban, supra note 29, at 487-93 (discussing whether and when paternalistic decisionmaking is
appropriate for lawyers).
50. In analyzing the professional conflict-of-interest rules, Kevin McMunigal seems to accept
the ABA's premise that the "actual impairment" or "risk of impairment" of the lawyer's performance
justifies forbidding concurrent representation and that this is the only potentially viable reason for
overriding client consent. McMunigal, supra note 1, at 833-34. McMunigal does note that an issue exists
regarding "who decides" what is "the proper balance of authority and responsibility between buyer and
client." Id at 871. Again, however, the sole factor he seems to consider relevant to that issue is who can
best assess the risk of impairment. See id. at 871-75.
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by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client." Thus, representing both
sides in adverse litigation is improper because the lawyer's decisions always
will harm one client's interests (or the lawyer's relationship with the client). 2
Arguably, the consent override protects the client from poor performance by a
lawyer who, by definition, is inadequate. 3
Interestingly, the ABA provisions' exceptions to the client's consent
authority are absolute. Even if a client has made a reasonable decision that the
benefits of retaining the lawyer outweigh the costs of the lawyer's inadequacy,
51. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(b)(1).
52. Similarly, representing differently situated parties in the same litigation is typically found to
be improper. See, e.g., Kelley's Case, 627 A.2d 597, 599-600 (N.H. 1993) (holding that one client's
indemnification of the other for potential damages arising out of the joint representation is insufficient to
validate a waiver where neither client is "sufficiently informed so as to understand the actual or potential
conflicts"); Whitman v. Estate of Whitman, 612 A.2d 386, 389 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (noting
that a lawyer's strategy to benefit a sole heir "dealt a potentially serious blow to the Estate"). Jarvis and
Tellam note:
As to opposing parties in business or litigation, the clear answer in Oregon and the
District of Columbia is that, with rare exception, lawyers may not represent both parties
even with disclosure and consent.... [R]epresenting opposing parties creates a fixed-sum
or zero-sum game-more for one participant necessarily means less for the other.
Jarvis & Tellam, supra note 1, at 173 (citations omitted); cf Conrad Chevrolet v. Rood, 862 S.W.2d
312, 314 (Ky. 1993) (finding that consent was not possible because the lawyer in a business transaction
had confidential information from one client that would be useful to the other); People v. McDowell,
718 P.2d 541, 545 (Colo. 1986) (holding that joint representation of both a buyer and a seller of a
corporation was impermissible even with the clients' consent because the lawyer "could not effectively
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of one of them without adversely affecting the
interests of the other"); In re Rockoff, 331 A.2d 609, 611 (N.J. 1975) (Pashman, J., concurring)
(advocating a per se prohibition of multiple representation in real property transactions); In re Lanza,
322 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 1974) (stating that simultaneous representation of two parties in negotiating a
contract ordinarily is impermissible); Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal
Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1295-96 (1981) (arguing that joint representation inevitably hurts
one of the two clients).
53. The only commentator who has considered the substantive issues relating to consent in
conflict-of-interest decisionmaking is Nancy Moore. See Moore, supra note 1, at 238. Moore analyzes
the then-proposed Model Rules and concludes that the client-override provisions are too diffuse:
[T]he wholesale transfer of decision-making power to lawyers in multiple representation
cases cannot be justified unless it is true-as both the ABA Code and the Proposed
Model Rules assume-that rational potential clients believe that a lawyer's objectivity
and superior legal knowledge always make him the more competent decision maker.
Id. Moore argues that this assumption is sometimes correct but often fails because a client has superior
information or a better feel for what is important to him. Moore therefore proposes an alternative
"capacity for informed and voluntary consent" standard. This standard focuses on (1) whether the clients
are likely to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the particular representation, and (2)
whether the decision is based on an assessment of those advantages and disadvantages rather than on
psychological or economic stress. Id. at 240; cf Jarvis & Tellam, supra note 1, at 147, 165 (considering
the waivability of conflicts primarily from the perspective of whether the prevailing rules require
clarification).
Although this Essay shares many of Moore's concerns, the approach it takes focuses less on
whether the client's choice is wise or duress-free and more on the decisions lawyers and clients should
be entitled to make. The psychological inquiry that Moore's analysis would require makes her proposal
difficult to apply. Moreover, unlike Moore, I envision a category of cases in which client interests are
not dominant. See infra text accompanying notes 55-73. I agree with Moore that there is another
category of cases in which lawyers have an independent obligation to reject joint representation. Under
my approach, however, the lawyer should make the assessment of whether to reject directly on the basis
of whether the engagement is reasonably consistent with the client's best interest. See infra text
accompanying notes 136-140.
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the codes reject the representation. 4 Unless the codes are taking the
counterfactual position that such cost-benefit analyses are per se faulty, the
only plausible justification for the exceptions is that societal or systemic
interests outweigh the client's own.
There are several possible interests the codes might be protecting. The
first is the systemic interest in resolving conflict-of-interest issues early in the
representation. Even when a client consents to a potential conflict, there is the
possibility that he will revoke the consent later in the representation.5
Moreover, in most jurisdictions, lawyers who have obtained a consent to
representation burdened with a potential conflict must obtain a second consent
once the potential develops into an actual conflict.5 Subsequent replacement
of the lawyer often delays prosecution of the matter, to the detriment of both
the client and the adversary. 7 When the replacement lawyer enters her
appearance near or in the middle of trial, the costs extend to the judicial
system." In cases in which the need to replace the lawyer seems likely to
occur, codes arguably are justified in requiring different counsel at the
outset.5 9
54. Arguably, the codes' mandates may encompass a limited exception for cases in which the
potential limitation of the representation is de minimis or extraordinarily unlikely to occur.
55. See, e.g., San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498
n.4 (Ct. App. 1985) (upholding a client's right to withdraw consent to joint representation); Griva v.
Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 846 (D.C. 1994) (same).
56. See, e.g., Klemm v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 513 (Ct. App. 1977) (noting that
once an actual conflict develops, a previous waiver of potential conflicts becomes ineffective); Lysick v.
Walcom, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414 (Ct. App. 1968) (holding that when a conflict develops between an
insured and insurer, the lawyer relying on consent to joint representation in an insurance policy must
seek an additional waiver to continue the joint representation); Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l
Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1989-115 (1989) (approving blanket prospective waivers but
requiring a new waiver once a potential conflict ripens into an actual conflict); cf Ishmael v. Millington,
50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 596 (Ct. App. 1966) (suggesting a lawyer must withdraw once "adversity of interest"
appears in the course of the representation); Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility &
Conduct, Formal Op. 1993-133 (1993) (noting a lawyer's "continuing responsibility to obtain [a waiving
concurrent client's] written consent in the event unanticipated circumstances arise which could adversely
affect the attorney's representation").
57. See, e.g., United States v. Stites, 56 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting the danger of a
court's being "whipsawed" by a subsequent reversal or successive motions); William H. Raley, Co. v.
Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 232, 236-37 (Ct. App. 1983) ("[IThe court... must consider in favor of
disqualification the disruptive effect of repeated disqualification proceedings on the administrative
process of the court and the financial burden of such proceedings on the moving party." (citation
omitted)).
58. Courts have considered these costs primarily in considering whether to honor a motion to
disqualify brought in the middle ofjudicial proceedings. One court reasoned as follows:
The court must weigh the combined effect of a party's right to counsel of choice, an
attorney's interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing
disqualified counsel and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding
against the fundamental principle that the fair resolution of disputes within our adversary
system requires vigorous representation of parties by independent counsel unencumbered
by conflicts of conflicts of [sic] interest.
River Vest, Inc. v. Nickel, 234 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40 (Ct. App. 1987).
59. See, e.g., Comden v. Superior Court, 576 P.2d 971, 975 (Cal. 1978) (noting that a client's
right to representation by counsel of his choice must yield to considerations of ethics that "run to the
very integrity of our judicial process" (quoting Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir.
1975))); Chambers v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580-81 (Ct. App. 1981) (weighing the needs of
efficient judicial administration and the potential advantage of immediate preventative measures).
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Society may also desire unconflicted representation as a means to further
the pursuit of truth or, at least, of appropriate results within the adversary
syste-un. The adversary system purports to achieve its results through the
efforts of competing advocates who act in a fully partisan fashion." Arguably,
the client has a right to hurt himself by choosing counsel who lacks
independent judgment. Yet society has a right to insist that, when the
adversary system is invoked, the processes work in accordance with the
system's premises." Public confidence in the system is affected by the results
it produces. 3
Similarly, society has an interest in litigation in which valuable evidence
will be adduced in the pursuit of truth.' Conflicted representation may
interfere with that pursuit, as in the situation in which a lawyer hesitates to call
herself 5 or a necessary witness 66 to the stand in order to protect her own
60. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Trial courts have an
'institutional interest in protecting the truth-seeking function of the proceedings over which [they are]
presiding by considering whether [defendants have] effective assistance of counsel, regardless of any
profferred waiver[s]."' (quoting United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742,749 (3d Cir. 1991))).
61. See, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 89 (David
Luban ed., 1984) ("Each side of an adversary proceeding is represented by a lawyer whose sole
obligation is to present that side as forcefully as possible; anything less, it is claimed, would subvert the
operation of the system."); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 54 (1991) ("[T]he assumption is that aggressive,
competitive lawyering, guided exclusively by client interests, produces appropriate results.");
Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note 52, at 1294 (arguing
that the "loyalty" considerations underlying conflicts rules "occup[y] a central position in an adversary
system whose legitimacy rests on the most zealous possible presentation of each party's position").
62. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988) (upholding the disqualification
of a lawyer despite a client's waiver because joint representation represented a threat to the
administration of justice); River West, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 40 (holding that judges evaluating
disqualification motions must weigh, inter alia, the client's interest in choosing counsel against "the
fundamental principle that the fair resolution of disputes within our adversary system requires vigorous
representation of parties by independent counsel unencumbered by conflicts of... interest"); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Kent, 653 A.2d 909, 920 (Md. 1995) (holding that consent to a conflict is not
legally effective when it would undermine the "public interest," as when it would result in preventing
the public disclosure of a crime); see also MGM v. Tracinda Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327, 331 (Ct. App.
1995) (noting the court's interest in the "scrupulous administration ofjustice and in the integrity of the
bar" and "considerations of ethics that run to the very integrity of our judicial process" (emphasis
omitted)); Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 451 (1979) (holding that the rule against conflicted
representation guards against "abuse of the adversary system"); cf Lon Fuller, The Adversary System, in
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 34-36 (H. Berman ed., rev. ed. 1971) ("The judge cannot know how
strong an argument is until he has heard it from the lips of one who has dedicated all the power of his
mind to its formulation.").
63. Cf State v. Rivera, 556 A.2d 1227, 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) ("[A] defendant's
right to counsel of choice [can be] outweighed by the need to preserve public confidence in the judicial
system .... "); Graf v. Frame, 352 S.E.2d 31, 38 (W. Va. 1986) ("[W]here the public interest is
involved, an attorney may not represent conflicting interests even with the consent of all concerned. It is
essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of
justice." (citation omitted)).
64. See, e.g., Collett, supra note 35, at 580 (describing how joint representation may result in
"critical facts" being omitted); Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting
Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1030-32 (1967) (arguing that competitive lawyering helps factfinders
understand evidence and law); Zacharias, supra note 61, at 54 (arguing that the adversary process helps
"ensurel that factfinders will not overlook obscure but relevant information").
65. In deciding whether to engage a lawyer in a case in which the lawyer might be, or should be,
called as a witness, a client needs to recognize that the lawyer's representation may undermine her
credibility as a witness, to the client's detriment. Alternatively, one option for employing the lawyer
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conflicting interests or those of a third party.67 Again, society may have a right
to give its interest in the truth-seeking process68 a higher priority than the
client's interest in autonomy.69
Even where one cannot point to specific injuries to the process that
conflicted representation produces, the codes and courts may conclude that
certain kinds of representation "appear" so unfair as to warrant rejection of a
client's choice.70 A client may, for example, wish the adversary's lawyer to
represent him in the same litigation. The client may perceive sufficient
benefits in the arrangement to justify the obvious disadvantages of the
arrangement.7' But observers of the litigation may not perceive the benefits, or
they may otherwise disagree with the client's calculus. These observers will
lose confidence in the merits of a system that seems to afford the client no
better representative than the opposing lawyer. For the sake of the system, a
may be for the client to forgo using the lawyer as a witness on the grounds that she is not "necessary,"
even if potentially helpful. Even if the client wants the lawyer to continue as counsel, however,
professional rules typically regulate the lawyer's decision to engage in the representation because the
system and the adversary may have an interest in receiving the lawyer's testimony. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES, supra note 2, Rule 3.7.
66. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing a hypothetical scenario).
67. For example, in the scenarios discussed above, see supra text accompanying note 39; supra
note 65 and accompanying text, the lawyer may have an interest in encouraging the client to forgo using
her as a witness so that the lawyer can reap the rewards inherent in undertaking the representation.
68. These interests include, inter alia, maintaining a justice system that produces appropriate
results, providing appropriate deterrence through criminal and civil verdicts, and assuring fair
compensation to injured victims of torts and crimes.
69. One situation in which concurrent clients' interests clearly may be inconsistent with societal
interests arises when a single lawyer represents multiple clients before a grand jury. Because the lawyer
can orchestrate stonewalling by both clients (i.e., the exercise of their Fifth Amendment rights), the
lawyer can interfere with the prosecution's efforts to obtain incriminating evidence from one against the
other. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Disqualification of an Attorney Representing Multiple Witnesses
Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1, 4 (1979) (analyzing
the stonewalling issue); see also Covy, supra note 40, at 812-13 (discussing the potential conflict
between a client's right to counsel of choice, his right to effective assistance of counsel, and "the judicial
interest in promoting the effective administration ofjustice"). In Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
164 (1988), the Supreme Court held that in some such instances, society's interests in the fair
administration of justice may outweigh the clients' interest in insisting on the benefits of joint
representation. See also United States v. Stites, 56 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir, 1995) (overruling a
defendant's consent to counsel's conflicted representation on the basis of the need for proper judicial
administration); United States v. Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding the
government's standing to allege the existence of a conflict of interest in the representation of multiple
grand jury witnesses on the grounds that the lawyer's advice to "stonewall" the grand jury would hamper
the investigation); Pirillo v. Takiff, 341 A.2d 896, 902-06 (Pa. 1975) (same).
70. See, e.g., McMunigal, supra note 1, at 840-42 (discussing the "appearances of impropriety"
rationale for rejecting concurrent representation); Neil D. O'Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 313, 350 (1979) (arguing that the
appearance-of-impropriety rationale requires delineation); Anthony G. Flynn, Note, Disqualification of
Counsel for the Appearance of Professional Impropriety, 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 343, 362-63 (1976)
(discussing cases relying on the appearance-of-impropriety rationale); Regina Zelonker, Note,
Appearance of Impropriety as the Sole Ground for Disqualification, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1516, 1523
(1977) (supporting a two-part test for evaluating motions to disqualify based on the "appearance of
impropriety"); cf Victor H. Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the
Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. Rav. 243, 265 (1980) (discussing the judicial
use of appearance-of-impropriety reasoning in conflicts and other cases and concluding that it "is simply
too dangerous and vague a standard to serve as a foundation for guiding professional conduct").
71. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 35-43.
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court arguably should be able to rely on the "appearance of impropriety"72 to
reject the consent.73
Thus far, I have considered two categories of justifications for overriding
consent: protecting the client and protecting independent interests of the legal
system. A third category, however, may better explain the ABA code's
exceptions.
In the words of the Restatement, it seems unlikely that informed rational
clients will often choose representation that is "objectively inadequate."74 Yet
empirically, client consent to conflicted representation is not unusual.75
Perhaps regulators and courts are unwilling to honor client choice because
they distrust the motives of the lawyers who advise the clients or distrust the
explanations that the lawyers give clients on the merits of waiving conflicts.76
Lawyers have a vested economic interest in retaining their clients.77 By
sending a client to another lawyer, a lawyer risks losing not only the particular
case but also future cases that the client might bring her.78 Thus, the lawyer
has an incentive79 to phrase her explanation in a way that encourages the client
to waive the conflict-to believe that the lawyer herself is somehow unique."°
72. Zelonker, supra note 70, at 1523 (approving the "appearance of impropriety" rationale as a
basis for disqualification motions); see also Moore, supra note 1, at 214, 227-29 (discussing the
rationale that overriding client consent may be necessary to preserve "lawyers' reputations through an
avoidance of apparent impropriety").
73. See, e.g., In re Bentley, 688 P.2d 601, 605 (Ariz. 1984) (relying, in part, on the appearance-
of-impropriety rationale).
74. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 202 cmt. g(iv); see also supra text accompanying notes 27-
30 (discussing the Restatement's approach to waiver).
75. See O'Toole, supra note 70, at 321 (discussing a large number of pre-Model Rules cases in
which courts relied on. Canon 9 of the Model Code in disposing of disqualification motions); Steinberg
& Sharpe, supra note 1, at I & n.1 (discussing the "continual parade of litigation" involving conflict
issues); Craig D. Grear, Current Developments, Conflicts oflnterest: Simultaneous Representation, 2
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103 (1988) (discussing actions against law firms that agree to engage in
conflicted representation).
76. At least one commentator has mentioned this issue in the context of evaluating what degree
of information clients must receive before giving their so-called "informed consent." See Strauss, supra
note 4, at 341-44.
77. See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO's IN CHARGE? 106-15 (1974)
(discussing how lawyers' incentives influence decisions they make on behalf of clients); cf Fred C.
Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1303, 1351
(1995) (discussing the effect of lawyers' natural incentives in causing lawyers to adopt a highly partisan
approach to representation).
78. Clients tend to stick with the lawyers they have. A client who engages in continuing
communications with a lawyer to which the client has been referred will often discuss new matters with
that lawyer as well.
79. A lawyer's economic incentives in engaging in conflicted representation sometimes may
extend beyond a mere desire to keep the client. When the lawyer is implicated in wrongdoing, referring
the client elsewhere may result in action being taken against her. See, e.g., Fairfax Say., F.S.B. v.
Weinberg & Green, 685 A.2d 1189 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (involving a firm that had overbilled its
client in one case and encouraged the client to waive the conflict in subsequent representation, inter alia,
to avoid having the overbilling become public). That, in part, may be why the Model Rules have framed
the inquiry for nonwaivable conflicts as whether "a disinterested lawyer" could properly "ask for such
agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent." MODEL RULES, supra note 2,
Rule 1.7 cmt. para. 5.
80. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 8) (describing the different kinds of advice
lawyers might give clients faced with a conflict of interest).
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The codes attempt to guide lawyers and to counteract their economic
incentives by requiring lawyers to think in terms of the conflict rules.8'
Nevertheless, the self-interested lawyer who views the conflict provisions as a
roadblock to be circumvented often can obtain misguided waivers. Judicial
inquiry into the informed nature of the consent ordinarily will not counteract
such conduct.82 By the time the case reaches court, the lawyer will have
prepared her client and convinced him that she is essential to his cause.
In short, there are a number of theoretically defensible justifications for
overriding client consent. These range from assuring that the consent truly
reflects the exercise of client autonomy to protecting the client against his own
unwise choices to furthering independent societal interests to simply
providing prophylactic protections against improper influence by lawyers in
inducing a waiver. The ABA rules do not specify the bases for their
anticonsent provisions. The California code does not recognize any of the
justifications, leaving it to the courts to raise and evaluate them.
IV. KLEMM
In Klemm v. Superior Court of Fresno County,83 a husband and wife
agreed to dissolve their marriage amicably. Custody of their children was to
be joint, and the wife waived alimony and child support payments.84 The
couple could not afford an attorney. A family friend agreed to represent them
both without compensation."
The matter became complicated when the County District Attorney's
Office petitioned the court to require child support payments of $50 per
month.86 The County's interest lay in the fact that the $50 would be used to
offset AFDC payments made to the wife. The couple's attorney, armed with
written conflict waivers from husband and wife, appeared on their behalf to
Lawyers also have some economic incentives to avoid conflicted representation when their
performance may be impaired. Poor performance may result in client dissatisfaction or a tarnished
reputation. See McMunigal, supra note 1, at 833-34 (noting the existence of incentives to avoid
conflicted representation but arguing that the adoption of professional conflict-of-interest rules implicitly
assumes that such incentives are insufficient in practice).
81. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7 cmt. para. 5 ("[A] lawyer's need for income
should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable
fee."); see also Lee E. Hejmanowski, Note, An Ethical Treatment of Attorneys' Personal Conflicts of
Interest, 66 S. CAL. L. Rv. 881, 892 (1993) (discussing the interplay between conflict-of-interest
regulation and lawyers' economic incentives in accepting representation).
82. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1981)
(adopting the Boivin rule that consent must be informed); Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak,
820 F. Supp. 1212, 1216-17 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (rejecting consent as uninformed); cf In re Perry, 194
B.R. 875, 879 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (inquiring into the validity of a client's waiver); People v. Johnson, 164
Cal. Rptr. 746, 751 (Ct. App. 1980) (finding implied consent after inquiring into its presence).
83. 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1977).
84. See id. at 510-11. This waiver was not unreasonable in light of the fact that the husband
earned a meager living as a part-time carpenter. See id at 510.
85. Seeid. at510-11.
86. See id. at 511.
87. See id.
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object to the County's petition.8" The trial court refused to accept the conflict
waivers and required both Mr. and Mrs. Klemm to seek independent counsel.89
They instead sought a writ of mandamus to overturn the trial court's decision.
The California Court of Appeals's opinion turned on the court's view of
the facts. It concluded that the conflict between husband and wife was
potential in nature.90 Legally, the wife could ask the court to order child
support at a later date,9' for example after her AFDC benefits lapsed.
Currently, however, only the state stood to profit. Thus, the court reasoned,
her decision to oppose child support and waive her lawyer's conflict of
interest was reasonable in light of her desire to maintain amicable relations
with her husband.92 The conflict was potential; potential conflicts may be
waived with the client's intelligent and informed consent.
The Court of Appeal's holding was unsurprising in light of the absolute
consent provision in California's professional rules. 93 The court's dicta on the
issue of consent in cases of actual conflict of interest was more controversial.
Despite the language of the professional rules, the court stated:
As a matter of law, a purported consent to dual representation of
litigants with adverse interests at a contested hearing would be
neither intelligent nor informed. Such representation would be per
se inconsistent with the adversary position of an attorney in
litigation, and common sense dictates that it would be unthinkable
to permit an attorney to assume a position at a trial or hearing
where he could not advocate the interests of one client without
adversely injuring those of the other.94
Had there been an actual conflict between Mr. and Mrs. Klemm-for
example, if child support payments would have inured to her benefit-the
couple's lawyer could not have continued the representation. 95 This despite the
reality that the couple could not afford independent representation and that the
cost of independent counsel might well have exceeded the amount in dispute.
Klemm's dicta concerning nonwaivable conflicts has been cited
approvingly in subsequent cases.96 But to date, no court has used Klemm to
88. See id. These were the facts on which the court based its decision. To give the court its due,
however, the actual situation was a bit more complicated. Most significantly, before signing the written
waiver, Mrs. Klemm had expressed confusion as to whether there was a conflict and whether she wanted
the lawyer to continue. See id
89. See id.
90. See id. at 512.
91. See id at 513.
92. See id.
93. In Klemm, the court was following the old California professional rule regarding concurrent
conflicts of interest. See id. at 511-12. This rule included essentially the same absolute consent provision
as its successor. See CAL. BAR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-102(b) (1981) ("A member of
the State Bar shall not represent conflicting interests, except with the written consent of all parties
concerned.').
94. Klemm, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
95. See id. at 513.
96. See cases cited supra note 9.
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disqualify counsel in a case in which both clients consent to the lawyer's
representation. California law thus remains unclear on whether clients'
decisions to waive counsel in cases of actual conflict must be honored.
V. THE LESSONS OF KLEMM
At first glance, the Klemm court's distinction between potential and
actual conflicts seems semantic. Potential conflicts range from purely
hypothetical conflicts97 to conflicts that are nearly ripe and extremely likely to
occur.98 Likewise, even the actual conflict the Klemm court pointed to as the
paradigm-simultaneous representation of adversaries at a contested
hearing 99 -can be hypothetical. For example, the facts at a contested hearing
may not be in dispute and the conflicting arguments of law may be clear and
evident to the judge. A single lawyer may be able to focus the issues
sufficiently (at least competently enough) to enable the court to decide,
without disadvantaging either party. At the very least, therefore, the dividing
line between likely potential conflicts and theoretical but unimportant actual
conflicts blurs.'
When one scrutinizes the Klemm court's one-paragraph explanation of
nonwaivability, one cannot help noticing that the court-perhaps without
knowing it"0-identifies two separate justifications for its holding. Initially,
the court concludes that consent in the paradigm situation would, by
definition, "be neither intelligent nor informed."'0 2 Subsequently, the court
states that dual representation would be "per se inconsistent with the
[lawyer's] adversary position," which would render dual representation
"unthinkable" for the court to allow.10 3
This Essay has already noted that a client's decision to waive
independent counsel can be intelligent. Indeed, when the cost of independent
97. See, e.g., In re Candida S., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521, 528-29 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a
lawyer for multiple sexually-abused children in a single dependency hearing was not subject to
disqualification by the parents); Castro v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors, 284 Cal. Rptr. 154,
161 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the representation of separate parties by separate administrative units
of a county nonprofit corporation involved potential conflicts so "speculative" in nature as to pass
muster under the conflicts rules).
98. See, e.g., Kelley's Case, 627 A.2d 597, 600 (N.H. 1993) (holding that not even one client's
promise to indemnify the other sufficed to offset the real risks of the potential conflict); Whitman v.
Estate of Whitman, 612 A.2d 386, 389-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (holding that a potential
conflict between a sole heir and an estate is serious because of possible intestacy interests).
99. See Klemm, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
100. See McMunigal, supra note 1, at 847 (arguing that the distinction between actual and
potential conflicts "reflects an underlying conceptual confusion as to the appropriate response to
situations which threaten attorney impairment").
101. It would be a fair reading of Klemm to conclude that the court's surprising dicta resulted
from its loose use of language and inadvertent conflating of multiple rationales. Whether that is the case
or not, the resulting decision does reflect the tensions in the law of consent that this Essay addresses and
provides a useful vehicle for analyzing that tension.
102. Klemm, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
103. Id.
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representation exceeds the expected recovery° 4 -as it probably did in
Klemm-a client would be foolhardy to bear the cost. The Klemm court
therefore must have been focusing on the "informed" part of "intelligent and
informed."'0 5 It apparently believed that a client who waives a lawyer's actual
conflict is so often misinformed or has been advised so poorly that inquiring
into the nature of the waiver on a case-by-case basis is not worth the effort.
The Klemm court's second rationale focuses on the adversary system.
The court identifies only the single example of dual representation of direct
adversaries at a contested hearing. But there are other situations in which a
conflict may keep a lawyer from engaging in fully adversarial advocacy. For
example, when a lawyer has an incentive to avoid injury to an opponent0 6 or
when she contracts with the client to avoid calling a witness to the stand,1
0 7
she has the same effect on the adversarial process as the dual representative.
The lawyer has put herself in a position in which she may not introduce all
favorable evidence on her client's behalf or in which she may intentionally
fail to articulate the client's strongest arguments.
The Klemm court's concern about the lawyer's nonadversarial nature
cannot rest solely on the danger to the client's interests because, as we have
seen, such danger may be outweighed by benefits that the client prefers to
pursue.' O8 Under the California rules, at least, if the client is fully informed
about the risks, his right to decide his own preferences should govern." 9 In
stating that it is "unthinkable" to honor this consent, the Klemm decision must
be focusing on the system's independent interests in adversarial lawyering.
Arguably, judges and juries need the help of partisan advocates in introducing
all evidence favorable to each party and in sifting the arguments to reach
appropriate results."'
The ramifications of this analysis for California's professional rules are
significant. Klemm highlights a small universe of cases in which the client is
not entitled to choose even though he can best gauge his own interests. The
regulatory focus on protecting clients and the attorney-client relationship must
give way to other considerations that the courts deem more important."' In
this universe, lawyers initially and courts, in the final instance, must protect
the adversary system's independent interests in partisan advocacy.
104. By "expected recovery," I refer to the potential recovery, discounted for its improbability
and the costs of obtaining the recovery (including attorneys' fees).
105. "Intelligent" and "informed" clearly are linked concepts. I do not mean to suggest that courts
parse them finely in evaluating waivers. Nevertheless, each term has separate substantive content that
probably plays a role in judicial evaluations of consent.
106. For instance, this would be true if the opponent were a valued client in other matters.
107. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing such a scenario).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
109. See CAL. RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3-310.
110. Cf Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (approving a lawyer's decision to omit briefing
issues that his client wanted him to argue before the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
on grounds that lawyers serve an important function in winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal); see
also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the putative effects of adversarial advocacy).
111. Cf Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389 (1992)
(arguing that the phenomenon of professional regulation is based on a vision of lawyering that is
different from the vision of the courts).
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In the other, larger universe of cases, the client's interests matter most. A
properly informed client may choose his lawyer based on his own preferences.
The Klemm court's reluctance to accept client consent in actual conflict cases
simply suggests that the professional rules are inadequate to insure that clients
receive the proper level of information.
In this regard, California's conflict provisions posit ideal representation,
in which a lawyer plays out her role as impartial advisor. The rules envision
lawyers as client-centered assistants who anticipate conflicts, provide full
information concerning the risks of the representation, and encourage clients
to seek independent counsel. Yet, as noted above, lawyers often have their
own agendas. The rules neither confront the need to guide lawyers on how to
advise clients nor provide incentives to counteract lawyers' natural tendency
to seek waivers." 2 Nor do the rules establish mechanisms for enforcing
lawyers' obligations.
Indeed, by mixing the issues of what constitutes a conflict, when a client
may choose to accept it, and what lawyers should do before participating in
the representation, the California rules send lawyers a faulty message. The
rules suggest that if clients are willing to waive a conflict, that decision should
govern. This suggestion masks the existence of distinct systemic interests and
distinct lawyer obligations that bear on the appropriateness of a waiver.
The ABA rules, though more cautious about client consent, share the
failings of the California provisions. Again, the regulators seem to focus
exclusively on the client's interests and the attorney-client relationship. Model
Rule 1.7(a), for example, covers the Klemm type of situation in which the
lawyer is asked to represent clients who are direct adversaries."3 If the clients
consent, the sole issue the lawyer must consider is whether the representation
of one client will "adversely affect the relationship with the other client.""' 4
Rule 1.7(a) does not require the lawyer to consider either whether waiving the
conflict is wise from the client's perspective or whether a waiver would
adversely affect any systemic interests in partisan representation.
Model Rule 1.7(b) covers less direct conflicts in which a lawyer's
representation may be limited by her obligations to other clients."' Here, the
issue for the lawyer is whether she reasonably believes "the representation
will . . . be adversely affected.""' 6 The "representation," however, includes
limitations to which the lawyer and client have agreed under Model Rule
1.2.' The rule therefore does not preclude representation in which the client
112. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
113. See supra Part IV.
114. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(a)(1) (emphasis added).
115. See id. Rule 1.7(b).
116. Id. Rule 1.7(b)(1) (emphasis added).
117. Under Model Rule 1.2, a lawyer and client may agree to "limit the objectives of the
representation if the client consents after consultation." MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.2(c). With
some exceptions, this includes the right to limit the means by which the representation is to occur. See
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: Limited Performance Agreements and the
Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at Part IV, on
file with The Yale Lav Journal) (identifying areas in which lawyers and clients may limit objectives).
The case law tends to honor most such agreements and the codes do as well, provided the basic
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agrees to limitations that keep the lawyer from optimizing the
representation."' Model Rule 1.7(b)(2) does require the lawyer to explain the
implications and risks of a conflict waiver, but it does not require the lawyer
to steer the client away from consenting." 9 Indeed, the rule specifically
requires the lawyer to identify the advantages of common representation as
well. '2 And, again, Model Rule 1.7(b) does not require lawyer or client to
take into account systemic interests in independent representation.
When read together, the current California rule, the ABA provisions, and
cases like Klemm 2' illustrate that a single rule cannot adequately embody the
separate interests of clients, lawyers, and the system. 22 One rule is needed to
identify those situations in which clients may not waive a conflict even if
competence of the lawyer is not threatened. For a full discussion of this issue, see Fred C. Zacharias,
Limited Performance Agreements: Should Clients Get What They Pay for?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
(forthcoming 1998) (on file with The Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter Zacharias, Performance
Agreements], and the ensuing debate in Hyman & Silver, supra, and Fred C. Zacharias, Reply to Hyman
and Silver: Clients Should Not Get Less Than They Deserve, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming
1998) (on file with The Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter Zacharias, Reply].
118. For example, the lawyer and client may agree not to pursue particular claims because of their
effect on third parties.
119. Arguably, failing to guide the client adequately can be conceived of as failing to assure
"informed" consent and therefore a breach of the lawyer's obligation. The rules themselves, however,
simply require the lawyers to provide the client with information.
120. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(b)(2) ("[T]he consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved."
(emphasis added)).
121. See cases cited supra note 9.
122. Issues of autonomy and client waiver arise in many legal contexts and in many substantive
areas other than law. Cf supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting the presence of these issues in the
medical context). Not all contexts, however, involve the same countervailing considerations that are
found in the legal ethics arena. In evaluating issues of patient consent to medical treatment, for example,
scholars focus mainly on the patient's interests and on what makes consent informed, rather than on
separate societal interests in disallowing consent. But cf BROCK, supra note 31, at 33-34 (arguing that
patients have a moral duty not to delegate medical decisions). Only in a few medical contexts, such as
abortion and physician-assisted suicide, have scholars or the courts even considered overriding a
patient's voluntary decision to accept or refuse treatment.
With respect to waivers of rights in other legal contexts in which the exercise of autonomy
generally is honored-for example, the contract and criminal contexts-courts have deemphasized the
issue of whether a waiver benefits a litigant in favor of a free-market approach that focuses almost
exclusively on whether a waiver was "voluntary" or "knowing and intelligent." See, e.g., Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (holding that the key for consent to police searches is whether the
consent was voluntary); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (holding that a waiver of the
right against self-incrimination must be "knowing and intelligent"); Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1, 5 (N.Y.
1908) (defining a proper waiver of a contractual condition as "the intentional relinquishment of a known
right"). Unlike in legal ethics situaations, society sometimes happily accepts the most stupid of waivers,
so long as the consenting party is informed. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996)
(holding that a consent to a search was valid even though the defendant did not realize he was free to go
without a search); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986) (requiring only that the defendant
"understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them" for a waiver of the right
against self-incrimination to be valid); see also 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 685 (3d ed. 1961) (noting that a contractual waiver is
"knowing" as long as the party is aware of the relevant facts, even if the party is ignorant of their legal
effect). In these contexts, independent societal interests in regulating the conduct of participants in the
transaction are implemented through separate doctrines, rather than through assessments of whether the
waiver was valid. See infra note 123.
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waiver might benefit the client."z A separate rule should shape the parameters
of informed consent-identifying the information clients need in order to
exercise their autonomy in a meaningful fashion." 4 A third provision must
focus on the lawyers themselves. It should provide guidance as to how
lawyers should approach the issue of client waiver-encouraging lawyers to
consider systemic interests where waiver is impermissible and only the
clients' interests where consent is allowed.'25 A perfect rule also would
provide enforceable standards for lawyer behavior in the consent context.
VI. A MODEL WAIVER PROvIsIoN
The following pages propose three rules to govern actual and potential
conflicts of interest among concurrent clients. In jurisdictions like California,
which seek to honor client autonomy in all respects,2 6 the bracketed portions
of the proposed rules would not be appropriate. Jurisdictions following the
general ABA approach should be willing to adopt the three provisions in full.
The first rule identifies conflicts of interest that are nonwaivable because
of systemic interests in having independent counsel.
123. Employing an independent rule distinguishing nonwaivable from waivable conflicts is
consistent with society's approach to autonomy in other contexts. It is commonplace for society to
identify specific areas in which citizens' autonomy will not be honored because society disapproves of
particular choices. Typically, this disapproval takes the form of outright legal prohibitions. Laws
forbidding suicide, abortion, dueling, driving without a seatbelt, and the like fit within this category.
In a few areas, society has expressed a general preference in favor of free will but has specified
limited circumstances in which independent societal interests outweigh individual rights. In contract
cases, for example, independent societal interests are implemented through the rubric of separate
doctrines of "public policy." See, e.g., Cudahy Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Quirk, 165 N.W.2d 116,
118 (Vis. 1969) (declining to enforce a promise to pay off on a dare on the grounds that gambling is
against public policy). In criminal cases, societal interests generally are enforced through the imposition
of constitutionally derived rules to curb police misbehavior. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479
(establishing a prophylactic rule limiting custodial interrogations). Unlike the current legal ethics codes,
however, contracts and criminal law for the most part implement the independent societal interests
directly, rather than under the guise of evaluating the quality of the party's waiver. This Essay's
proposals follow that approach.
One significant exception in criminal law bears mentioning; namely, the U.S. Supreme Court's
"scrupulous" scrutiny of a defendant's consent to interrogation after the right to counsel has been
asserted. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 101 n.7 (1975) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474)
(holding ineffective a consent to interrogation after counsel has been requested). The justification for this
special hurdle to the exercise of the defendant's choice is similar to the California court's apparent
rationale in Klemm: society's interest in maintaining respect for the adversarial process (i.e., a defendant
acting through his advocate) once litigation begins. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626 (1986)
(reaffirming Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)) (noting the importance of protecting the
accused's choice to communicate through counsel).
124. This has been the focus of the medical and legal scholarship addressing the issue of
"informed consent." See sources cited supra notes 4, 26.
125. See Zacharias, supra note I (manuscript at 8-9) (suggesting, in passing, the need to create a
separate rule that provides guidance to lawyers).
126. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
127. Although the precise reasons for its rule are not clear, Texas applies a narrower, but similar,
provision forbidding consent to multiple representation in cases involving "opposing parties to the same
litigation." TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.06(a) (1997).
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RULE 1. A lawyer may not accept or continue representation in
any matter in which:
(a) a tribunal is scheduled to decide or is likely to decide the
matter; and
(b) the lawyer's ability to present evidence or to make arguments
to the tribunal is reasonably likely to be limited by the lawyer's
obligations to a person"' other than the lawyer's client.
Rule 1 focuses on litigation, because that is where the societal interests in
adversarial process come into play.'29 Transactional matters may give rise to
associated concerns when a transaction becomes the subject of litigation;
subsection (a) takes those concerns into account by covering matters that are
"likely" to be decided in court. There also may be reasons unrelated to
litigation why lawyers should not represent two clients in a particular
transaction, such as each client's need for loyalty. 3 However, because
transactions typically are contractual in nature and are framed by each client's
desires, informed client consent suffices to govern the choice of representation
and the choice of contract.' 3 ' In other words, until public dispute resolution
processes are implicated, society has no interest in independent representation
that is separate from the clients' own interests.'32
Rule 2 and its accompanying comment would govern waivable actual
and potential conflicts of interest among concurrent clients. It identifies, as
well as possible, the nature of the information that clients must receive before
being allowed to consent. Subsection (c) adds the ABA requirement of an
objective determination by the lawyer that joint representation is feasible.
RULE 2. A lawyer may not accept or continue representation in
any matter in which the interests of the lawyer's client in the matter
conflict or potentially conflict with another client's interests in the
matter unless:
128. "Person" refers to any legally recognizable body or institution.
129. See supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 955 (Cal. 1994) (using loyalty concerns as a
reason for disallowing multiple representation).
131. Thus, for example, even in cases in which the California courts would forbid a client waiver
at the trial stage, see supra text accompanying note 94, the courts apparently would allow joint
representation at an earlier stage. See, e.g., Davidson v. Davidson, 204 P.2d 71, 77 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1949) (allowing joint representation in drafting divorce settlements).
132. This aspect of Rule 1 has important implications for a lawyer who acts as a mediator for two
parties. To the extent the lawyer's very function is to bring about settlement, Rule 1 is inapplicable even
though the two parties are direct opponents. Under the ABA's Model Rule 1.7(a), the mediator-lawyer
considering such joint representation would need to evaluate her "relationship" with the two clients.
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(a). This consideration is still relevant in ABA jurisdictions under
proposed Rule 2(c). But the more significant question for the lawyer under this Essay's proposals (i.e.,
Rule 3(d)) is whether mediation is reasonably consistent with each client's best interests, a decision that
the ABA approach does not explicitly require the lawyer to make.
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(a) the lawyer has fully informed both clients of the concurrent
representation, including all foreseeable disadvantages 33 to the
clients stemming from the concurrent representation and all
foreseeable advantages to the clients that would accrue if they
obtained independent representation;
(b) both clients consent[; and
(c) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with either client].
COMMENT: In determining whether a client has an "interest in the
matter" for purposes of this rule, the lawyer shall consider:
(1) whether the client, or any person or organization related to the
client, is a party;
(2) whether the client has a significant personal or economic
relationship with a party; and
(3) whether the client has a significant economic stake in the
outcome of the matter.
A general interest in the legal issues to be decided, alone, should
not be deemed to constitute an interest in the matter. If, however,
the legal decisions in the case are likely to become controlling
authority in a separate matter or matters involving the second
client, the lawyer must comply with Rules 2 and 3.
It is significant to note that Rule 2 eliminates the distinction between
actual (or direct) and potential conflicts that is found in Model Rule 1.7(b). 4
In potential conflicts cases, Model Rule 1.7(b) changes the focus of the
lawyer's inquiry from the likely effect of the concurrent representation on the
relationship with the clients to its likely effect on "the representation" and the
lawyer's "judgment."'35 Under proposed Rule 2(c), the maintenance of the
relationship with the clients remains important to the consent issue; the
133. The Model Rules require lawyers to advise clients of the advantages ofjoint representation.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(b)(2). My proposal does not include such a requirement on
the assumption that lawyers will offer this information in any event, because it may help them keep the
client. Nevertheless, any jurisdiction wishing to add the requirement can do so without adversely
affecting the proposal.
134. The Oregon rule, discussed supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text, emphasizes the
distinction between actual and potential conflicts even more than the ABA rules do. Primarily for
reasons of process and paternalism, Oregon would consider actual conflicts nonwaivable and potential
conflicts waivable. See Jarvis & Tellam, supra note 1, at 172-76 (defending the Oregon rule).
The distinction is deemed less important under this Essay's proposals. The proposed rule already
carves out the category of cases that should, as a theoretical matter, truly be considered nonwaivable. For
the situations that the Oregon rule anticipates, the proposed rule leaves uncovered only those actual
conflict situations in which clients are informed and waive the conflict but in which there are sound
reasons not to trust the waiver.
Oregon's approach to these cases relies upon an overbroad, bright-line rule that forbids all consent.
This Essay's proposal is more deferential to client autonomy. It protects clients by requiring full advice
to clients who wish to consent and by requiring lawyers to engage in separate introspection that includes
an independent judgment by the lawyer that a waiver is in the client's best interests.
135. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7(b).
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absence of a trusting attorney-client relationship may undermine the lawyer's
ability to advise the client on whether to consent.'36 The separate
considerations of the effects on the representation and the effects on the
lawyer's judgment remain relevant to the information the lawyer must give the
clients and to the lawyer's personal decision of whether to accept the
representation under Rule 3. Those factors, however, no longer are considered
a basis for discounting the informed or intelligent nature of a client's consent.
Rule 3 provides separate guidance to the lawyer on the question of
whether the lawyer should agree to represent clients who have waived an
actual or potential conflict. The rule starts from the generally accepted
presumption that clients ordinarily are best served by independent
representation. Like most existing rules, it posits that lawyers should not be
willing to engage in conflicted representation unless they are satisfied that a
client's waiver is informed and intelligent. Rule 3, however, goes further in
attempting to help lawyers understand when they should accept or decline the
engagement.
RULE 3. In deciding whether to accept or continue representation
under Rules 1 and 2, a lawyer should decline the representation
unless:
(a) the lawyer has fully informed the client(s), orally and in
writing, 137 of the possible negative effects of any actual or potential
conflict of interest on the representation or the lawyer's judgment;
(b) the lawyer has fully informed the client(s), orally and in
writing, of the benefits of obtaining independent representation;
(c) the lawyer reasonably believes each potentially affected client
understands the disadvantages of retaining the lawyer;
(d) the lawyer reasonably believes that each potentially affected
client has made the decision to consent to the representation of his
or her own free will;
(e) the lawyer reasonably believes that the client's decision to
consent to the representation is reasonably consistent with the
client's best interests in the matter[; and
(f) the lawyer reasonably believes that the client(s) would not
receive better representation by an independent lawyer].
Because a lawyer has a fiduciary responsibility not to favor her own
interests in representing the client over the client's interests,1 38 subsection 3(e)
136. Cf supra notes 77-80 (discussing a lawyer's obligations in advising a client on whether to
consent).
137. The requirement of written information is a prophylactic requirement currently employed by
some jurisdictions to ensure that clients receive the necessary advice and to protect lawyers who are
subsequently accused of failing to provide full information. Forcing the lawyer to commit the advice to
writing also makes her focus on doing a good job in the information-giving process. Hence, this Essay's
proposal includes a writing requirement in Rule 3, which is to guide lawyer behavior, but not in Rule 1,
which is more concerned with defining the content of the advice. Different jurisdictions could
reasonably incorporate a writing requirement into Rule 2 or eliminate it altogether.
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requires the lawyer to consider whether the decision to waive a conflict is
reasonably consistent with the client's best interests. In California, which
emphasizes autonomy, the decision that the waiver is reasonably consistent
with the client's interests should suffice to honor the client's choice. In
jurisdictions following the ABA's preference for allowing a lawyer's
determination to override the client's,'39 subsection 3(f) adds the requirement
that the lawyer agree with the client that she can supply representation at least
as good as the client could obtain elsewhere, given the client's resources. 4 °
The ABA approach would not automatically honor the client's decision that
mere cost savings justify lesser representation.
Together, these three rules produce several advances over the current
California rules and ABA models. First, as in the Klemm case,' 4 ' they identify
when systemic interests absolutely forbid a conflict waiver. Second, they
avoid the blurry distinction between actual and potential conflicts of interest.
Third, the rules clarify the information that clients must receive before
waiving a conflict and the basis upon which clients are authorized to waive;
they assure that a client's waiver decision is both informed and intelligent.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the proposed framework provides
separate guidance to lawyers who, for personal reasons, are tempted to seek or
accept a client's decision to waive. Such guidance is particularly important in
cases like the hypothetical involving representation of joint criminal
defendants, in which there are both valid and unsatisfactory reasons for clients
to waive independent representation. 42 Rule 3 reminds lawyers that their
138. Conflict-of-interest rules like Model Rules 1.7 to 1.9 are designed, in part, to codify lawyers'
fiduciary obligations to their clients. See, e.g., Goldman v. Kane, 329 N.E.2d 770, 772-73 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1975) (imposing a strict standard of fiduciary care upon lawyers); RESTATEMENT, supra note 25,
§ 28 cmt. b ("A lawyer is a fiduciary."). As I have discussed elsewhere, the lawyer's obligation to
prioritize her client's interests over her own extends to the retainer stage of the representation. See
Zacharias, Performance Agreements, supra note 117 (manuscript at 18, 45) (noting a lawyer's duty to
make sure the client is signing a reasonable retainer agreement).
139. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 45-47.
140. The comment to Model Rule 1.7 puts the determination in terms of whether a "disinterested
lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances
.. " MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7 cmt. para. 5; see also Fairfax Say., F.S.B. v. Weinberg &
Green, 685 A.2d 1189, 1213-14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (implementing the Model Rules comment).
141. In Klemm, discussed supra Parts IV and V, the current California rule appears to allow the
litigants to waive the conflict. Under the ABA approach, the lawyer cannot accept the waiver if she
believes the representation will "adversely affect [her] relationship" with either client, MODEL RULES,
supra note 2, Rule 1.7(a), or if she believes "the representation will... be adversely affected." Id. Rule
1.7(b). Although the clients' consent might overcome the first hurdle, it probably fails under the second
test; the representation of at least one client is likely to be adversely affected (though the client might
reasonably believe that bearing the costs of the negative effect is warranted).
Under the rules proposed in this Essay, the result is straightforward. Klemm falls within Rule l's
nonwaivable conflict category. There is no need to weigh the advantages and disadvantages to the clients
or to evaluate the nature of the consent because societal interests in the adversarial process trump
autonomy concerns.
142. See supra text accompanying note 10. This hypothetical scenario implicates all of the
possible reasons for allowing and overruling consent. A trusting relationship between a lawyer and her
client typically is critical in the criminal context. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal
Distinction in Professional Responsibility, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 169-70 (1996) (describing
and questioning the traditional characterization of helpless and dependent criminal defendants). The
client's right to choose a particular attorney also seems especially important. See, e.g., Caplin &
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decision to represent a client is separate from the client's decision to forgo
independent representation. The lawyer's decisionmaking must be exercised
in light of the lawyer's continuing duty to act in the client's best interests.
Quite apart from clarifying the resolution of conflict issues, adopting the
proposed rules would have significant practical effects on the various actors in
the legal system. Except in the small universe of nonwaivable conflict cases,
courts would play a smaller role in deciding whether representation may
proceed.'43 Once a lawyer consults with her clients and the lawyer agrees to
proceed, the rules leave in the clients' hands the decision as to whether
concurrent representation is in the clients' interests.'" The only issue into
which a court reasonably might inquire is whether a client was, or could be,
45
Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (recognizing a limited constitutional right to retain
one's choice of counsel); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (same). At the same time,
however, the danger of unintelligent (or incompetent or coerced) waivers and the risk that one client's
interests will be subordinated to those of the other are at their height. In the hypothetical scenario, it is
likely that the lieutenant's interests will be subordinated to the kingpin's interests, either because the
kingpin is paying for this privilege or because that subordination is part of the lieutenant's job
description. Even in less dramatic circumstances, one of two codefendants usually can improve his lot
by making a deal that incriminates the other. Moreover, independent systemic interests in requiring
separate representation clearly come into play. See supra note 68 (discussing the interest in preventing
stonewalling by the defendants and in preserving the proper functioning of the evidentiary process).
The California rule, again, leaves the choice to the defendants, as long as they are properly
informed. Model Rule 1.7(b), in contrast, forbids the representation unless the lawyer can honestly
conclude that neither client's representation will be adversely affected-as, for example, in situations in
which stonewalling is likely to improve the lot of both clients. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule
1.7(b).
This Essay's proposed rules would divide the scenario into two kinds of cases. When the possible
defenses at trial are different for the two defendants and partially inconsistent, Rule l(b) would
forcefully take the line that the Supreme Court has cautiously adopted. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159-60
(recognizing that the client's interests, though important, may need to give way to the societal interest in
the proper administration of justice); see also Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626 (finding that a
criminal defendant's right to the counsel of his choice is limited); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1983) (holding that a client's right to the counsel of his choice sometimes must give way to the court's
interest in the efficiency of trials). The system's interests govern. Joint representation is impermissible.
When, however, the actual trial defense of the two defendants is consistent and the only conflict
involves possible cooperation and plea bargaining, Rule 1 does not apply. In ABA jurisdictions, Rule
2(c) may forbid the representation, because the lawyer's relationship with one defendant can be affected
by the other defendant's interest in plea bargaining (or lack thereof). But when push comes to shove, the
major issue under the proposed rules involves the application of Rules 3(e) and 3(f). The lawyer must
decide whether the representation is reasonably consistent with the client's best interests and, in ABA
states, whether one client would be better served by independent representation. If the answer is
affirmative, then the lawyer must honor her fiduciary obligation to implement her client's interests by
declining the representation. The resolution of this issue probably turns on whether stonewalling is likely
to be the best approach for both clients.
143. Cf Green, supra note 43, at 72-73 (arguing that the disqualification of lawyers for an alleged
conflict ordinarily is "not an appropriate sanction" and should be reserved for cases in which the
disqualification is necessary to prevent harm to the client); James Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of
Attorney Disqualification, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 419, 423, 429 (arguing that the professional
requirements requiring lawyers to avoid conflicts should be strict but that courts should not overuse
these requirements to disqualify lawyers in litigation).
144. Cf John F. Sutton, Jr., Introduction to Conflicts of Interest Symposium: Ethics, Law, and
Remedies, 16 REv. LIM. 491, 493 (1997) ("A pressing but inadequately probed issue is the extent to
which legal standards for conflicting interests should vary according to the remedy being sought.").
145. The question of whether the client "could be" adequately informed encompasses three main
issues: first, whether the client has the mental wherewithal to comprehend the situation; second, whether
the subject matter is so complex that comprehension becomes impossible, see supra note 47 and
Waiving Conflicts of Interest
adequately informed. The number of motions to disqualify counsel should
therefore decrease dramatically.
That does not mean, however, that clients are unprotected from lawyer
misconduct if they proceed with concurrent representation.'46 The proposal
would shift the focus to the initial decision made by the lawyer to accept the
case-a decision Rule 3 requires the lawyer to make with the clients' interests
in mind. Failure of the lawyer to abide by this requirement-for example, in
the real estate transaction hypothetical 47 -may subject the lawyer to
discipline, 4 ' malpractice liability,'49 or a loss of fees.5 The clients' "rights"
thus become more a matter between lawyer and client than a subject of
satellite litigation prompted by adversaries who are using the conflict rules for
tactical advantage.''
Finally, as a theoretical matter, the proposed rules serve an educational
function for lawyers.'52 By separating the issue of whether clients may consent
accompanying text; and third, whether the lawyer-client relationship is sufficiently stable that the client
can accept the information the lawyer provides and evaluate the lawyer's advice fairly. This Essay's
proposals address the first and second issues in Rules 2(b) and 3(a)-(c) and the third issue in Rules 2(c)
and 3(d)-(f).
146. See Epstein, supra note 35, at 579 ("To get a conflict-of-interest question wrong may...
well expose the errant lawyer to a wide range of sanctions, including... forfeiture of fees, disciplinary
proceedings, and perhaps in extreme cases even criminal sanctions.").
147. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In the example of the representation of the buyer
and seller of real estate, Rule I is inapplicable unless litigation over the matter is likely to occur. The
system's interests in a properly functioning adversarial process do not come into play.
In situations like the real estate example, clients who have the information and capacity to
understand the situation have the right to exercise their free will in the matter. So long as the lawyer
fully informs the clients and, in jurisdictions following the ABA approach, reasonably believes her
relationship with both clients is adequate to withstand the information-giving process, Rule 2 would
allow the waiver.
That does not end the inquiry, however, for there is still the lawyer's role to consider. Rule 3
requires the lawyer to consider whether, given her function, she can in good conscience represent both
sides. Most importantly, under Rule 3(e), she must consider whether the clients' decision is "reasonably
consistent with [their] best interests in the matter," taking all cost and other considerations into account.
In ABA states, Rule 3(f) would require her to make the further judgment of whether, realistically, the
client or clients would be better off being represented by independent counsel.
148. See, e.g., In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1978) (imposing professional disciplinary
sanctions upon an attorney for representing a buyer and a seller in a single real estate transaction).
149. See, e.g., Simpson v. James, 903 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding malpractice liability
judgment for negligence caused by a lawyer's conflict of interest in representing concurrent clients);
Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595-96 (Ct. App. 1966) (noting the possibility of malpractice
liability for representation tainted by a conflict of interest).
150. See, e.g., Electro-Wire Prods. v. Sirote & Permutt, P.C., 40 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994)
(remanding a case for disgorgement of fees received, due to a serious conflict of interest ignored by a
lawyer); Financial Gen. Bankshares v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 762-63 (D.D.C. 1981) (relying on a
conflict of interest in deciding a fee dispute), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Goldstein v. Lees, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Ct. App. 1975) ("It is settled in California that an attorney
may not recover for services rendered .. . in contradiction to the requirements of professional
responsibility.").
151. See, e.g., Green, supra note 43, at 74 (noting court's wariness of tactical disqualification
motions); Lindgren, supra note 143, at 430, 434-36 (arguing that "disqualification is not the same as
discipline"); O'Toole, supra note 70, at 314 nn.5-10 (cataloguing cases involving tactical
disqualification motions).
152. To quote Nancy Moore's evaluation of the conflict-of-interest rules proposed in the Model
Rules, the significance of new ethics regulation "is not limited to a change in the basis, or even
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from whether the lawyer should accept the representation, the rules remind a
lawyer of her role as a client representative and inform her that the role
extends to the retainer stage of the representation.'53 The fact that violation of
the rules can lead to discipline or malpractice liability is only of minor
significance; the number of conflict cases that will give rise to punishment
probably is small.'54 Far more significant is the guidance the proposed rules
may provide to lawyers who, though willing to abide by professional norms,
nonetheless have come to equate permissible conduct with appropriate
conduct in the conflict-of-interests realm.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Essay has used California's unique conflict-of-interest rules as a
starting point for analyzing the nature of consent and waiver in conflict-of-
interest cases. Rulemakers in California and elsewhere have based current
provisions on assumptions about client autonomy that are not clearly
expressed. Likewise, some jurisdictions have unthinkingly limited client
autonomy in ways that can undermine clients' ability to protect their own
interests.
All modem conflict rules share California's fundamental respect for
client autonomy. The ABA approach balances the interest in autonomy against
the benefits of paternalism. As Klemm suggests, however, limits on client
autonomy also may stem from independent societal interests that simply
outweigh client rights. Or, they may encompass a distrust of lawyers'
willingness to discharge their fiduciary obligations to clients.
In the process of promulgating rules to identify when waiver is
permissible, virtually all the rulemakers have neglected to guide lawyers. All
modem legal ethics codes fail to provide standards to govern the lawyer's
decisionmaking regarding whether to accept a conflict-laden engagement."'
Inevitably, this omission encourages lawyers to base their decisions on self-
interest.
It is therefore fair to conclude that the conflict provisions in all American
jurisdictions could stand improvement. This Essay's proposal attempts to
distill the three necessary elements of a complete waiver rule: protecting client
frequency, of attorney discipline-it should also educate the honest practitioner." Moore, supra note 1,
at 212.
153. See Zacharias, Performance Agreements, supra note 117 (manuscript at 45) (arguing that
lawyers are obligated to protect a client's interests even at the retainer stage); Zacharias, Reply, supra
note 117 (manuscript at 5) (same).
154. See, e.g., F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is
It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. LEGAL F. 193, 212-13 (citing a study of client complaints showing that,
in one jurisdiction during 1970, only 13 of 2031 client complaints alleged a conflict of interest); cf 1
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & NV. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.7:103, at 227-28 (1998 Supp.) (noting that professional
discipline for engaging in conflicted representation has been rare but predicting an increase in
disciplinary activity).
155. Of course, some codes do state when lawyers must reject particular client waivers, but that is
not the same as informing lawyers when they should accept a case that a client may offer them. See
supra text accompanying notes 136-140.
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autonomy in an appropriate way, safeguarding societal interests that outweigh
autonomy, and guiding lawyers in fulfilling their role as servants of client
interests. More radical methods of implementing these elements are possible.
One might write specialized rules tailored to particular areas of practice,'56
types of lawyers,'57 or different clienteles. 5 Whatever approach rulemakers
adopt, however, the core message of this Essay's proposal remains the same:
Code drafters need to remember the multiple purposes their rules are designed
to serve.
In analyzing these conflict-of-interest issues, this Essay has taken a
traditional route to reform. It addresses state authorities that are responsible
for drafting professional rules within their jurisdictions. Again, more radical
alternatives are available. The ABA's Ethics 2000 project, which is designed
to revisit and react to flaws in the model professional codes,'59 might consider
revamping the model waiver rules. 6 ' Yet even without national attention to
the issues, the proposed waiver rules are sufficiently narrow and limited that
156. As I have discussed at length elsewhere, there are categories of specialized practice that give
rise to special ethical dilemmas. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO.
WASH. L. Rav. 169, 190-204 (1997). For example, the conflict-of-interest issues that arise in elder law
and corporate situations often seem distinct from those that arise in ordinary practice, both in their nature
and frequency. See id. at 195-96 (describing special considerations that distinguish elder law and
corporate practice).
157. For example, there may be reasons to distinguish between solo or small-firm practitioners
and large-firm lawyers, either because of the nature of the lawyers' resources or the types of clients they
represent. See id at 188 (distinguishing various settings of practice for the purposes of writing
professional rules). The difficulty in identifying conflicts of interests in large firms is magnified because
a firm's lawyers may not be aware of the past and present clients represented by other lawyers in the
firm. They may not be familiar with the legal issues implicated by the cases of other firm lawyers. At the
same time, mechanisms for screening conflicts in large firms may be relatively sophisticated. It may also
be possible to separate conflicted lawyers within a firm through a "Chinese Wall'--something that is
not possible for solo or small-firm practitioners.
158. This Essay has already noted some characteristics that distinguish clients in small towns and
those who do business in specialized fields. See supra text accompanying note 42. The nature of
particular types of clients-particularly their mental capacity and sophistication-is another important
factor in evaluating the validity of waivers. Rulemakers might consider drafting specialized conflict and
waiver rules for particular types of clients. See Zacharias, supra note 156, at 186-90 (discussing the
possibility of categorizing ethical roles according to a lawyer's clientele).
159. See ABA Starts "Ethics 2000" Project for Sweeping Review of Rules, ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: CURRENT REPORTS (May 28, 1997), at 140 (describing the goal of
the Ethics 2000 project as "undertak[ing] an in-depth review and assessment of ethics rules during the
final years of the second millennium").
160. The recently-adopted Restatement presented an opportunity for reform. As promulgated,
however, the proposed Restatement purports to restate existing state law and, with some clarifying
wrinkles, it does just that. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, §§ 201-02, 206, 209-11. See generally
Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541 (1997)
(analyzing the proposed Restatement provisions relating to conflicts of interest).
In one respect, the Restatement's clarification foreshadows this Essay's proposals. Section 202(2)
directly forbids representation with respect to certain nonwaivable conflicts, including situations in
which "one client will assert a claim against the other in the same litigation" or in which "it is not
reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation." RESTATEMENT, supra
note 25, § 202(2). This provision has the virtue of highlighting the existence of nonwaivable conflict
situations. But to a large extent, the provision continues the Model Rules' failure to tailor its rule
adequately to the reasons why consent should not be honored.
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each state should be able to evaluate them independently.' 6' The rules can fit
any state's conception of what constitutes a conflict of interest. The rules'
terms can easily be modified to fit special preferences of individual states.
This Essay's analysis should not be interpreted as denying the very real
differences between California and the ABA regarding conflicts of interest
and conflict waivers. The two approaches to client consent reflect a
substantive disagreement about the emphasis legal ethics should place on
autonomy and the degree to which lawyers should act paternalistically
towards clients. Nevertheless, as Klemm illustrates, California's bright-line
rule probably overemphasizes the proautonomy position. 61 The ABA
anticonsent provisions seem equally exaggerated in that they purport to forbid
clients to waive conflicts even for good reasons.'63
The flaws in both approaches stem from the code drafters' failure to
analyze the meaning of autonomy and their failure to confront the real dangers
of client waivers. These are dangers that impose costs not only on clients, but
also on the legal system and the legal profession. This Essay has attempted to
bring these unspoken considerations to light.
161. I have suggested elsewhere the possibility of federalizing legal ethics. See Fred C. Zacharias,
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REv. 335 (1994). The main difficulties recurring with respect to
conflicts-of-interest rules, however, do not relate to disuniformity in state regulation or to peculiarly
federal issues. Thus, congressional legislation would not seem to be the most appropriate means of
addressing the issues discussed in this Essay.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 108-111.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 111-120.
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